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Abstract 
The role of investors in the capital market has not been adequately studied. And what is the effect of investor on 
corporate governance has not reach the same conclusion. This paper empirically tests the relationship between 
earnings management and investors’ attention. And it also investigates how the firms’ type of ownership affects 
the relationship between earnings management and investors’ attention. Using the data of Baidu searching 
volume index of the non-financial Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2011, we construct a measure of investor 
attention in this paper and find that firms with higher investors’ attention are exposed to higher level of earnings 
management. Compared with state-owned enterprises, investors’ attention has a larger effect on the non state-
owned enterprises. This paper enriches our understanding of the corporate earnings management behaviour and 
the role of investor attention in corporate governance. 
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1 Introduction 
Information is one of the important goals of corporate governance (Tricker R I,2015). However, earnings 
management leads to poor quality of accounting information (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Earnings management 
means that the operators alters financial reports using accounting means or arranging transactions to mislead 
stakeholders' understanding of the company's performance. Literature shows that corporate governance has an 
effect on earnings management. Corporate governance mechanism can be divided into external and internal 
mechanisms. Internal corporate governance mechanism includes the establishment of the board, the appointment 
of independent directors, the arrangement of appropriate ownership structure and so on (Beasley 1996). External 
governance mechanism includes the legal system, media, analysts, and investors. Most existing researches on the 
topic of earnings management focus on the effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as the audit 
quality(Becker et al. 1998), the board of director characteristics(Klein 2002), the managers’ equity 
incentives(Cheng and Warfield 2005), and the CEO turnover(Hazarika et al. 2012). A few studies have also 
discussed the effect of media and analyst coverage (Yu 2008; Qi et al. 2014). However, the external effect of 
investor attention on earnings management has been ignored by the literature. As a matter of fact, investors’ 
attention plays an important role in the performance of a firm’s stock price which not only determines its 
financing cost, but also serves as an important indicator of the performance of its executives. Therefore, 
managers’ incentives to manage earnings may be closely related to investors’ attention.  
This paper uses the Baidu searching volume index as a proxy for investors’ attention and find that 
investors’ attention will cause higher capital market pressure on the managers, which motivate managers to 
manage earnings. Further results show that investors’ attention has less impact on state-owned enterprises than 
on private-owned ones. 
The contribution of this paper mainly lies in two aspects. First, it enriches the existing research on the 
determinants of earnings management by investigating the role of investor attention, and help us better 
understand how external pressure affect the executives’ motivations of earnings management.  Second, this 
paper find a different effect of investor attention on state owned enterprises and non state owned enterprises, 
which implicates inherent differences on the motivations of earnings management between state owned 
enterprises and non-state owned ones. 
 
2 Theory and hypotheses 
The separation of ownership and control leads to a conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. 
Managers have the motivation to conduct earnings management for his/her own interests which may be 
inconsistent with the interests of the shareholders and investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bergstresser D, 
Philippon T, 2006). One of the most popular way for Chinese investors to collect a firm’s information is to use 
Baidu search engine which takes up more than 80% of the search engine market share. Therefore, the Baidu 
searching volume index can reflect the degree of investors’ attention on each stock in Chinese stock market. 
Investors will make investment decisions based on the financial statement information of a firm. Their attention 
on the positive or negative information of a firm may directly affect the extent of upward or downward 
fluctuations of the firm’s stock price, which causes market pressure on the managers. One of the main 
motivations of managers to manage earnings is to receive a favourable feedback from the capital market. Faced 
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with high pressure from the capital markets, managers will take strategies to manage the earnings(Healy and 
Wahlen 1999). The increasing degree of investors’ attention will bring managers higher market pressure, and 
thus stronger motivation of earnings management. We can conclude the above analysis with the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: High degree of investors’ attention will lead to greater extent of earnings management by creating 
more market pressure on managers. 
Earnings management motivations are different between state-owned enterprises and private-owned 
enterprises (Bo and Wu, 2009). The managers of the private-owned companies care more on the firms’ stock 
market performance since their salaries and bonuses are usually closely related to it. . On the other hand, salaries 
and bonuses of the managers in the state-owned enterprises are less correlated with the stock market 
performance of the firm, i.e., their income is relatively stable regardless of the change of the firm’s stock price. 
Therefore, they care less on the firm’s stock market performance. Instead, the managers of the state owned 
enterprise may pay more attention to building up a good relationship with the superiors and the government so as 
to get a promotion more easily (Bo and Wu, 2009). Consequently, the managers of state owned enterprises have 
a weaker incentive to do earnings management, and the investor attention also has little effect on their behaviour 
of earnings management. In addition, when faced with high investor attention on the negative information of the 
state-owned enterprises, the government may use political power to support state-owned enterprises to improve 
its performance t. Therefore, pressure from capital market on state-owned enterprises is relatively small. In 
summary, we can conclude that investors’ attention in market has less impact on state-owned enterprises’ 
earnings management. 
H2: Investors’ giving less capital market pressure on state-owned enterprises than private-owned 
enterprises. State-owned enterprises are given less pressure from capital market by investors than private-owned 
ones. 
 
3 Data and model 
3.1 Variable Definitions 
3.1.1 Earnings management 
Following Dechow et al. (1995) and Aboody et al. (2005), this paper adopts the modified Jone’s model. Total 
accruals (TA) are calculated by equation (1) below, in which ∆CA stands for the changes in current assets, ∆CL 
stands for the change in current liabilities, ∆CASH stands for the change in cash and cash equivalents, ∆STDEBT 
stands for the change of short term liabilities maturing within a year, and DEPN stands for depreciation and 
amortization.  
it it it it it it
TA CA CL CASH STDEBT DEPN= ∆ −∆ −∆ +∆ −（ ）                      (1) 
Then we run the following cross-sectional OLS regression shown in model (2) within each industry 
classified by the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission. Assetit-1 represents the book value of total assets for 
firm i at year t-1. ∆REVit stands for the change in main operational revenues for firm i at year t, and PPE stands 
for the book value of fixed assets for firm i at year t.  
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Using the estimates 21 3, ,K K K  from the regression above, we can calculate the non-discretionary 
accruals (NA) with the formula (3), where ∆AR stands for the change in accounts receivable. 
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Finally, the discretionary accruals (DA) can be calculated by the difference between total accruals (TA) 
and non-discretionary accruals (NA), shown as 
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3.1.2 Investors attention 
The measure of investor attention in this article comes from the Baidu Index website (http://index.baidu.com). 
The Baidu Index is a massive data-analysis service based on Baidu web and news searches. Baidu searching 
volume index is used to indicate the degree of network exposure and users’ attention of any key words during a 
defined period. Baidu index can reflect the “user attention” of different key words in a period of time. Investors 
will use the companies’ name or stock code to search for it if they are interested in the company. This paper uses 
the average of the Baidu searching volume index on both of the two keywords, and then take its logarithm as the 
measure of investor attention, denoted by Matt.  
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3.1.3 Control variable 
According to existing literatures on the determinants of corporate earnings management, we choose a set of 
control variables including company size (Size), the return on assets (Roa), financial leverage (Lev) , sales 
growth (Growth), book to market ratio (Bm), auditor’s reputation dummy variable showing whether the auditor 
is one of big four or not (Big4), the share of institutional ownership, and a state ownership dummy variable 
showing whether the ultimate controller of the firm is state owned or not (dum_gy).  
 
3.2 Data sources and sample selection 
The sample of this paper includes all the non-financial A share Chinese listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchanges from 2007 to 2011. Except for the data of Baidu searching volume index manually collected from the 
Baidu’s website, the data of all the other variables are collected from  CSMAR data base. To exclude the effect 
of outliers, All the variables are winsorised at 1% level. The summary statistics is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Sd Max Min 
Da 0.168 0.123 0.160 0.802 0.002 
Matt 5.262 5.199 0.697 7.228 3.568 
Bm 0.629 0.620 0.261 1.193 0.090 
Growth 0.230 0.159 0.503 3.588 -0.687 
Size 21.76 21.62 1.251 25.41 18.69 
Lev 0.505 0.503 0.257 1.968 0.054 
Roa 0.040 0.037 0.065 0.239 -0.289 
Inst 0.181 0.122 0.180 0.728 0.000 
Audit 0.063 0.000 0.243 1.000 0.000 
Dum_gy 0.608 1.000 0.488 1.000 0.000 
 
3.3 Empirical model 
To test the hypotheses proposed in part 2, this article employs the following benchmark regression model 
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Where DAit represents the discretionary accruals for firm i at year t, mattit-1 represents the measure of 
investor attention for firm i at year t. Besides of controlling the effect of firm size (Size), financial leverage, 
return on assets (ROA), sales growth (Growth), market to book ratio (MB), auditor’s reputation (Big4), share of 
institutional ownership (Inst) and state ownership (dum_gy), we also control the industry (IND) and year fixed 
effects.  Based on the benchmark regression, we further divide the sample into two groups, state-owned 
enterprises and non state-owned ones to run subsample regressions.  
 
4 Empirical results 
The regression results are shown in table 2. It can be seen from the result that state-ownership is negatively 
related to the degree of earnings management, indicating that the earnings quality of state-owned enterprises is 
higher than private-owned enterprises’. The first column shows that investor attention has a positive and 
significant effect on the company's earnings management behaviour, reflecting that investors can produce market 
pressure on the company. Hypothesis 1 is thus verified. The second column and the third column show the 
regression results on the group of non state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises respectively. It can be 
found that investor attention has a significant and positive effect on earnings management in the non state-owned 
enterprises group, while its effect on earnings management in the state-owned enterprises group is not significant. 
This result indicates that compared with non state-owned enterprises, investor attention has little impact on 
earnings management in state-owned enterprises. This evidence supports Hypothesis 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) 
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Note: The standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***p < .001. **p < .05. *p < .01. 
 
5 Robustness test 
Our robustness test uses the working capital model proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) to re-measure the 
extent of earnings management. Total working capital accruals(TWCA) is expressed as follows: 
jt jt jt jt jt
TWCA CA CL CASH STDEBT= ∆ −∆ −∆ +∆（ ）                                (6) 
∆CA、∆CL、∆CASH、∆STDEBT is defined the same as modified Jones model. The projected total working 
capital accruals is then regressed on the cash flows from operating activities at previous, current and the next one 
period, by each industry and year. The regression model can be expressed as follows: 
, 1 , , 1
0, 1, 2, 3, ,
, 1 , , ,
jt j t j t j t
t t t t j t
j t j t j t j t
TWCA CFO CFO CFO
a a a a
Asset Asset Asset Asset
ε− +
−
= + + ++                              (7) 
Where CFO represents cash flows from operating activities. The absolute value of the regression residuals 
represents the level of earnings management on working capital, denoted as EMWC in this paper.  Replacing the 
dependent variable in model (5) with EMWC, we can get the regression results shown in Table 3. It shows that 
our main results do not change significantly. The regression results still support the result that investor attention 
has a significant and positive effect on the earnings management of non state owned enterprises, but not on state-
owned enterprises. 
Table 2 Earnings management and investor attention 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All sample Non state owned enterprises State owned enterprises 
 DA DA DA 
Matt 0.020*** 0.040*** 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Bm 0.033*** 0.111*** -0.025* 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.014) 
Growth 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.070*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
Size -0.020*** -0.048*** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Lev 0.058*** 0.048** 0.063*** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.019) 
Roa -0.009 0.155* -0.149** 
 (0.051) (0.080) (0.060) 
Inst -0.013 -0.004 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.012) 
Audit -0.007 -0.015 -0.015* 
 (0.007) (0.021) (0.008) 
Dum_gy -0.030***   
 (0.005)   
constant 0.410*** 0.990*** 0.151** 
 (0.062) (0.114) (0.070) 
N 6222 2436 3786 
r2 0.086 0.108 0.091 
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Table 3 Robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All sample Non state owned enterprises State owned enterprises 
 EMWC EMWC EMWC 
Matt 0.023*** 0.044*** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Bm 0.025** 0.106*** -0.033** 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) 
Growth 0.062*** 0.058*** 0.065*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
Size -0.026*** -0.055*** -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Lev 0.065*** 0.051** 0.081*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) 
Roa 0.049 0.193** -0.058 
 (0.053) (0.076) (0.072) 
Inst 0.003 0.015 0.005 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.012) 
Audit 0.002 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) 
Dum_gy -0.030***   
 (0.005)   
_cons 0.588*** 1.007*** 0.219*** 
 (0.059) (0.102) (0.078) 
N 6227 2449 3778 
r2 0.099 0.125 0.083 
Note: The standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***p < .001. **p < .05. *p < .01 
 
6 Conclusion 
Using the data of Baidu searching volume index of the non-financial Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2011, this 
paper constructs a measure of investor attention on each firm and investigates the relationship between investor 
attention and earnings management. According to the regression results, investor attention can produce a market 
pressure on the company. The higher is the degree of investor attention, the higher is the extent of earnings 
management. Further empirical evidence found in sub-sample regressions shows that the ownership type of the 
firm plays a key role in the relationship between Higher investor attention causes market pressure and leads to 
significantly higher earnings management in non-state-owned enterprises, while it has no significant impact on 
earnings management in state-owned enterprises. The Conclusions of this study indicate that outside investors 
cannot play an efficient supervisory role in corporate earnings management behaviour but may instead reinforce 
it. This means that the market needs more powerful and efficient compelling force to restrict the corporate 
earnings management and convey true information of a firm. Therefore, it is necessary to improve regulatory 
agencies’ monitoring efficiency and market supervision mechanism, and strengthen law enforcement to promote 
the formation of an efficient capital market. There are some weakness in my research? We can investigate these 
in the future. What causes the investor attention? Does the media or the analyst affect investor attention? And 
what is the relationship between investors’ attention and the stock price synchronicity? 
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